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Abstract 
In our paper, we try to investigate the courses of inflation tax and seigniorage revenue for 
policy makers of the Turkish economy. For this purpose, we first construct an ex-ante 
seigniorage revenue maximizing inflation model, and then calculate annual inflation tax and 
seigniorage revenues for the post-1980 period Turkish economy. Following these theoretical 
issues, an empirical model is constructed upon the Turkish economy, and our expost 
estimation results reveal that inside the period considered, the Turkish economy lies on the 
correct or efficient side of the seigniorage maximizing Laffer curve. 
Key Words: Seigniorage, Inflation Tax, Laffer Curve, Turkish Economy 
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___________________________________________________________________________ 
Senyoraj Geliri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi 
Özet 
Çalışmamızda, Türkiye ekonomisi için politika yapıcılar açısından enflasyon vergisi ve 
senyoraj gelirlerinin nasıl bir gelişim gösterdiği incelenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Bu amaçla, ilk 
olarak kuramsal beklentilerimiz doğrultusunda senyoraj gelirlerini ençoklaştıran enflasyon 
oranı modeli oluşturulmakta ve 1980 sonrası Türkiye ekonomisi verileri dikkate alınarak 
yıllık elde edilen enflasyon vergisi ve senyoraj gelirleri hesaplanarak bu gelirleri ençoklaştıran 
enflasyon oranı tahmin edilmektedir. Elde ettiğimiz sonuçlar Türkiye ekonomisinin inceleme 
dönemi içerisinde senyoraj gelirlerini ençoklaştıran Laffer eğrisinin doğru ya da etkin 
tarafında bulunduğunu göstermektedir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Senyoraj, Enflasyon Vergisi, Laffer Eğrisi, Türkiye Ekonomisi 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Inflation had been one of the most important issues affecting the courses of the Turkish 
business cycles since the 1970s and 1980s. Having a two digits characteristic of chronic 
inflationary framework, as can be seen in Table 1 below, the Turkish experience constituted a 
privileged position in the world economy, which was neither hyperinflation of the two digits 
price increases in a monthly basis nor a moderate inflation of the single digit in an annual 
basis. Saatçioğlu and Korap (2006) examine various potential reasons leading the Turkish 
economy into such a process of inflation, 
 
TABLE 1: ANNUAL PER CENT CHANGE in CONSUMER PRICES of SOME 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  1987-96  97  98  99  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
       10 year average 
Turkey  70.9   85.0  83.6  63.5  54.3  53.9  44.8  25.3  10.6 
South Africa  12.1   8.6  6.9  5.2  5.4  5.7  9.2  5.8  1.4 
Hungary  21.8   18.3  14.3  10.0  9.8  9.2  5.3  4.7  6.8 
Chile   15.3   6.1  5.1  3.3  3.8  3.6  2.5  2.8  1.1 
Mexico  36.7   20.6  15.9  16.6  9.5  6.4  5.0  4.5  4.7 
Bulgaria  63.2   1061.2 18.8  2.6  10.4  7.5  5.8  2.3  6.1 
Poland  78.2   14.9  11.8  7.3  10.1  5.5  1.9  0.8  3.5 
Romania  76.8   154.8  59.1  45.8  45.7  34.5  22.5  15.3  11.9 
Russia   -----   14.8  27.7  85.7  20.8  21.5  15.8  13.7  10.9 
Brazil   656.6   6.9  3.2  4.9  7.1  6.8  8.4  14.8  6.6 
Argentina  193.3   0.5  0.9  -1.2  -0.9  -1.1  25.9  13.4  4.4 
Peru   287.4   8.5  7.3  3.5  3.8  2.0  0.2  2.3  3.7 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (April-2005) Table 11 of Statistical Appendix, 216-219, also cited in 
Domaç (2004) 
 
As a developing country, that the central government resorts to seigniorage revenues so as to 
finance its expenditures or to domestic borrowing possibilities or the case of taxation may, to 
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the great extent, affect the course of the domestic inflation, and this case can easily be related, 
for empirical purposes, to the question of whether the governments succeed in collecting the 
maximum possible seigniorage revenue due to the monopoly of printing money. Thus, 
examining this issue may help us to obtain some clues or foresight for the privileged position 
of the Turkish economy inside the world economy. 
 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section two interests in the theoretical relationships 
between the seigniorage and inflation tax, while section three gives some sytlized facts in the 
Turkish economy, following the definitions presented in the prior section. In line with these 
considerations, section four tries to estimate an empirical model á la Cagan (1956: 25-117) 
and examines whether the seigniorage maximizing inflation values are attained in the Turkish 
economy. And the final section concludes. 
 
II. SEIGNIORAGE AND INFLATION TAX 
 
From a theoretical perspective, some distinctions would probably be necessary between 
seigniorage revenue collected from printing money and inflation tax. Seigniorage can be 
defined as the value of real resources acquired by the government through its ability to print 
money (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 1994: 491).1 Let SE represent the real seigniorage 
revenue, M nominal money balances or the non-interest bearing high powered money and P 
price level. So we can construct the real seigniorage relationship such as, 
 
SE = (ΔM/P) = (ΔM/M)(M/P) = μm        (1) 
 
where μ is the change in nominal money balances, m the real money balances and Δ the 
difference operator. Following Blanchard (1997: 430), the larger the real money balances held 
in the economy, the larger the amount of seigniorage corresponding to a given rate of money 
growth. On the other side, the inflation tax refers to the increase in nominal money balances 
which individuals have to accumulate to keep their real balances constant in an inflationary 
framework. Let IT be the inflation tax, 
 
                                                 
1 The term seigniorage comes from the French word seigneur which represents the feudal lord of the Middle Age 
who had monopoly power on his land to coin money (Blanchard, 1997: 431). 
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IT = (ΔP/P)(M/P) = πm          (2) 
 
where π is the inflation rate. Equation 2 provides that government can reduce the real value of 
the non-interest-bearing part of the government debt by using inflation (Begg, Fischer and 
Dornbusch, 1994: 491). In this sense, we can interpret π as the inflation tax rate and m as the 
tax base. When the inflation rate is zero, the government gets no revenue from inflation, while 
the amount of inflation tax received by the government would increase as the inflation rate 
rises. But as the inflation rate rises, people would reduce their holdings of money base due to 
the fact that monetary base is now more costly to hold. Thus, individuals hold less currency, 
and banks hold as little excess reserves as possible, and eventually the real monetary base 
falls so much that the total amount of inflation tax revenue received by the government falls 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994: 555-556).  
 
The difference between seigniorage and inflation tax arises from the changes in real money 
demand, which in turn may be the consequence of financial liberalization or changes in the 
inflation rate, real income, and interest rates. This difference is sometimes referred to as the 
non-inflationary component of seigniorage, as it is the increase in money demand that is 
consistent with a zero inflation rate (Rodrik, 1990). Besides, as the economy grows the 
government can obtain some revenue from seigniorage even if there is no inflation. That is 
because when the demand for real monetary base is growing, the government can create some 
base without producing inflation (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994: 555; Paya, 1997: 377; 
Sönmez, 1998: 364). If we consider a Laffer curve to represent the seigniorage revenue 
against inflationary framework, 
 
FIGURE 1: SEIGNIORAGE LAFFER CURVE 
 
Source: Şıklar (1998: 8) 
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where S represents the seigniorage revenue as a proportion of the GDP and π the domestic 
inflation rate. In Figure 1 above, we see that the seigniorage maximizing inflation rate is B 
with an inflation rate of π0. Before this point the higher the inflation rate the larger the 
seigniorage revenue by means of an increase in the base money, and to the right of the point 
B,  the higher the domestic inflation the lower the seigniorage revenue, since economic agents 
would try to avoid holding base money balances so that they can protect themselves from 
incurring inflation tax by reducing real monetary balances in their hands. We can also notice 
in Figure 1 that the same seigniorage revenue can be collected by imposing different inflation 
rates such as π2 and π1, where the tax rate is higher but the tax base is lower, that is the wrong 
side of the seigniorage maximizing Laffer curve in the latter case with respect to the former. 
In this line, the former coincides with the correct or efficient side of the Laffer curve, in which 
there is still opportunity for a higher seigniorage at higher inflation rates (Kiguel and 
Neumeyer, 1995: 672), and there is an implicit loss of seigniorage revenue if the economy 
moves to a lower level of inflation (Soydan, 2003).2 
 
III. THE COURSE OF SEIGNIORAGE AND INFLATION TAX IN THE TURKISH 
ECONOMY 
 
If we now follow the definitions given above, we can calculate the seigniorage revenue and 
inflation tax incurred by the Turkish economy as of the beginning of 1980 in an annual basis 
such as Anand and van Wijnbergen (1988), Rodrik (1990) and Altınkemer (1994). Following 
Rodrik (1990) in Table 2 below, seigniorage in our paper refers to the revenue raised by the 
monetary authority by issuing noninterest-bearing liabilities, i.e. base or reserve money (MB), 
and seigniorage revenue as a share of gross national product (GNP) is given by the increase in 
MB in a given year divided by the last year’s GNP, while inflation tax is obtained by 
multiplying annual CPI inflation with the preceding year’s MB over the GNP.3 All the 
calculations are based on the data taken from the electronic data delivery system of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), 
                                                 
2 Bruno and Fischer (1990: 353-374) relate analytically such a dual equilibrium, obtained at either a low or high 
inflation rate as a reflection of Laffer curve, to the expectations of economic agents and indicate that under 
rational expectations the high inflation equilibrium is stable and the low inflation equilibrium is unstable, while 
under adaptive expectations or lagged adjustment of money balances with rational expectations, the low inflation 
equilibrium may be stable. They also emphasize that a unique equilibrium is attained when the government sets a 
nominal anchor for the economy. 
3 For 1980, 1981 and 1982 the GNP deflator is used in constructing the annual inflation series. 
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TABLE 2: SEIGNIORAGE AND INFLATION TAX (% GNP)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 SEIGNIORAGE INFLATION TAX INFLATION(%) 
 (ΔMB/GNP)   (π*MB(-1)/GNP) 
1981  3.51    2.64    41.88 
1982  3.95    2.04    27.49 
1983  2.28    2.72    31.39 
1984  3.06    2.24    32.62 
1985  1.55    2.80    44.98 
1986  1.56    1.86    34.59 
1987  1.81    1.84    38.91 
1988  2.32    2.95    77.63 
1989  3.47    2.17    63.16 
1990  1.11    2.41    60.26 
1991  1.54    2.11    66.08 
1992 1.71   1.91   70.10 
1993  1.68    1.62    66.39 
1994  1.74    2.25    106.26 
1995  1.62    1.78    93.18 
1996  1.30    1.47    79.38 
1997  1.43    1.37    85.33 
1998  1.43    1.39    83.58 
1999  1.49    1.34    63.61 
2000  1.46    1.21    53.93 
2001  1.05    1.42    53.91 
2002  1.12    1.06    44.83 
2003  1.11    0.68    25.25 
2004  1.22    0.32    10.27 
2005  1.21    0.31    8.18 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Consistent with the findings of Rodrik (1990), we see in Table 2 that the public sector seems 
to rely on seigniorage and inflation tax revenue in the range of 1.5% and 3.0% of the GNP 
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along the whole 1980s, but beginning from the early 1990s and in line with the findings of 
Özmen (1998: 545-553) and Koru and Özmen (2003: 591-597), both inflation tax and the 
seigniorage revenue are tried to be kept relatively constant around only 1% of the GNP in the 
face of fluctuating and accelerating inflation inside the period, except the pre-1994 crisis 
period which points out applying to inflation tax for the policy makers. Besides, relatively 
high and accelerating periods of inflation do not necessarily require for larger seigniorage, as 
the higher levels of inflation result in substantial erosion in the real demand for money and 
reduce the base of the tax (Rodrik, 1990).4 
 
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE CAGAN MODEL FOR TURKISH ECONOMY 
 
To examine the issues of seigniorage revenue and inflation tax expressed so far, a standard 
way used for empirical purposes is of the form in Cagan’s (1956: 25-117) semi-logarithmic 
money demand function, relating real balances demanded as the outside money under the 
control of monetary authority or the narrowly defined money balances to the measure of 
inflation. Expressing analytically and using (M/P)d for real monetary balances demanded and 
π for the domestic inflation in exponential form, 
 
(M/P)d = Ae-απ           (3) 
 
or explicitly in natural logarithms, 
 
loge(M/P) = a - απ + ε          (4) 
 
where α is the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to inflation as the opportunity 
cost to holding money. Taking the partial derivative of real monetary balances with respect to 
the domestic inflation below, 
 
π* = (1/α)            (5) 
                                                 
4 De Haan, Zelhorst and Roukens (1993: 313-314) present inflation tax data of 42 developing countries including 
Turkey for the period 1962-1985, in which Turkey is inside the first 12 countries obtaining maximum inflation 
tax revenue as percentage of the GNP. Similarly, Adam, Ndulu and Sowa (1996: 536) give similar calculations 
of seigniorage revenue and inflation tax over twenty years for some African countries consisting of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Ghana. 
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we obtain the inflation rate (π*) that maximizes the seigniorage revenue. Using the model 
constructed so far, we now apply to the Turkish data and try to estimate a Cagan type model 
of money demand for the period of 1987.1-2004.4 using quarterly observations. We use a 
variety of econometric procedures available in the program EViews 5.0. All the data we use 
are taken from the electronic data delivery system of the Central Bank of the Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT) and indicate seasonally unadjusted values. The monetary variable we 
consider (LNREALM1) is the narrowly defined monetary balances in natural logarithms, 
which is the sum of currency in circulation and demand deposits in the banking system.5 
Under the assumption of no money illusion which is quitely reasonable for a cronic-high 
inflation country, we can suppose that the demand for money is a demand for real money 
balances. In our case, we use the consumer price index to deflate the narrow money supply. 
The variable representing alternative cost to hold money in our paper is the semi-elasticity of 
annualized monthly domestic inflation rate (INFLATION) based on consumer price index 
(CPI) with the base year 1987: 100, which is calculated as (CPI – CPI(-12)) / CPI(-12).6 Two 
impulse-dummy variables which take on values of unity for the years 1994 and 2001 
concerning the financial crises occured in 1994 and 2001 are considered as exogeneous 
variables. Below we give in Figure 2 the time series representation of the variables, 
 
FIGURE 2: TIME SERIES USED IN THE PAPER 
                                                 
5 Soydan (2003) express that if the source of seigniorage revenue is the base money creation, monetary base 
needs to be used in the analysis. On the other hand, holding demand deposits encounters a loss in the purchasing 
power, therefore is subject to inflation tax with the underlying implicit assumption of the direct relationship 
between M1 and base money, which is based on the constant money multiplier. Phylaktis and Taylor (1993: 35) 
touch on a similar issue emphasizing stationarity of the relationship of the ratio of narrow money to high-
powered money. 
6 Following Calvo and Leiderman (1992: 182), Easterly, Mauro and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995: 590), Selçuk (2001: 
43) and Soydan (2003), an alternative representation of the opportunity cost of holding money in relation with 
inflation can be considered such as [π / (1+π)] rather than π or lnPt – lnPt-1 where P is the price level and ln the 
natural logarithm operator, since the latter cases can be considered as better for the continuous time series and 
the former for discrete time series. Thus, as Soydan (2003) expresses, if the sequential values are not very close 
to each other the cost of holding money can be considered such as [π / (1+π)]. But in our paper, we apply to the 
semi-elasticity of original inflation series. 
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As a next step for our econometric analysis, we investigate the time series properties of the 
variables. Granger and Newbold (1974: 111-120) indicate the occurance of the spurious 
regression problem in the case of using non-stationary time series causing unreliable 
correlations within the regression analysis. At first, by using the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests, we check for the stationarity condition of our 
variables assuming constant and trend terms in the regressions. Thus, for the ADF and PP 
tests, we compare the ADF and PP statistics obtained with the MacKinnon (1996: 601-618) 
critical values also possible in EViews 5.0, and for the case of stationarity, we expect that 
these statistics are larger than the MacKinnon critical values in absolute value and that they 
have a minus sign. Although differencing eliminates trend, we report the results of the unit 
root tests for the first differences of the variables with a linear time trend in the test 
regression. The results are shown in Table 3 below,7 
 
TABLE 3: UNIT ROOT TESTS (assuming constant&trend in levels) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  ADF test  PP test  ADF test  PP test 
Variable      (in levels)     (in first differences) 
LNREALM1  -1.359490(0)  -0.986744(8)  -8.271087(1)* -10.4519(19)* 
INFLATION -1.045391(4)  -2.000710(3)  -6.349821(3)* -7.964732(2)* 
Test Critical Values  ADF and PP 
1% level   -4.096614 
5% level   -3.476275 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
When we examine the results of the unit root tests, we see that the null hypothesis that there is 
a unit root cannot be rejected for both variables using constant&trend terms in the test 
equation in the level form. But inversely, for the first differences of the variables the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is strongly rejected. So we accept that both variables contain a unit 
                                                 
7 For the MacKinnon critical values, we consider 1% and 5% level critical values for the null hypothesis of a unit 
root. The numbers in parentheses are the lags used for the ADF stationary test and augmented up to a maximum 
of 10 lags, and we add a number of lags sufficient to remove serial correlation in the residuals, while the Newey-
West bandwidths are used for the PP test. The choice of the optimum lag for the ADF test was decided on the 
basis of minimizing the Schwarz Information Criterion (SC). The test statistics and the critical values are from 
the ADF or UNITROOT procedures in EViews 5.0. ‘*’ indicate the rejection of a unit root for the %1 level. 
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root, that is, non-stationary in their level forms, but stationary in their first differenced forms, 
thus enable us testing for cointegration. 
 
We now examine whether the variables used are cointegrated with each other. Engle and 
Granger (1987: 251-276) indicate that even though economic time series may be non-
stationary in their level forms, there may exist some linear combination of these variables that 
converge to a long run relationship over time. If the series are individually stationary after 
differencing but a linear combination of their levels is stationary then the series are said to be 
cointegrated. That is, they cannot move too far away from each other in a theoretical sense 
(Dickey, Jansen and Thornton, 1991: 58). For this purpose, we estimate a VAR-based 
cointegration relationship using the methodology developed in Johansen (1995) in order to 
specify the long run relationships between the variables considered making use of EViews 5 
User’s Guide by QMS (2004: 735-748). Let us assume a VAR of order p, 
 
yt=A1yt-1+...+Apyt-p+Bxt+εt          (6) 
 
where yt is a k-vector of non-stationarity I(1) variables, xt is a d-vector of deterministic 
variables such as constant term, linear trend, seasonal dummies, and crisis variables and εt is a 
vector of innovations, i.e. independent Gaussian variables with mean zero and variance Ω. 
Such kind of exogeneous variables are often included to take account of short-run shocks to 
the system, such as policy interventions and shocks or crises which have an important effect 
on macroeconomic conditions. It is worth noting that including any other dummy or dummy-
type variable will affect the underlying distribution of test statistics, so that the critical values 
for these tests are different depending on the number of dummies included (Harris, 1995: 81). 
We can rewrite this VAR as, 
 
Δyt=Πyt-1 + 
1
1
p
i
−
=
Γ∑  ΓiΔyt-i + Bxt + εt         (7) 
 
where 
 
Π= 
1
p
i=
∑ Ai–I  Γi = -
1
p
j i= +
∑ Aj         (8) 
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Granger representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix Π has reduced rank r<k, 
then there exist kxr matrices α and β each with rank r such that Π=αβ´ and β´yt is I(0). r is the 
number of cointegrating relations (the rank) and each column of β is the cointegrating vector. 
The elements of α are known as the adjustment parameters in the vector error correction 
(VEC) model and measure the speed of adjustment of particular variables with respect to a 
disturbance in the equilibrium relationship. Johansen’s method is to estimate the Π matrix 
from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether we can reject the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of Π. Also we can express that this method performs better than other estimation 
methods even when the errors are non-normal distributed or when the dynamics are unknown 
and the model is over-parametrized by including additional lags in the error correction model 
(Gonzalo, 1994: 225). We thus first determine the lag length of our unrestricted VAR model 
for which the maximum lag number selected is 8 considering five lag order selection 
criterions, that is, sequential modified LR statistic, final predicton error criterion (FPE), 
Akaike information criterion (AIC), Schwarz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion (HQ). As the lag order selected in Table 4 below, LR, FPE, AIC and HQ 
statistics suggest 5, and SC statistics suggest 1 lag orders. We choose the lag order selected by 
the AIC and sequential LR statistics, that is, lag order 5.8 We also add eleven centered 
seasonal dummies which sum to zero over a year as exogeneous variable. In this way, the 
linear term from the dummies disappears and is taken over completely by the constant term, 
and only the seasonally varying means remain (Johansen, 1995: 84). 
 
As a next step, we estimate the long run cointegrating relationship(s) between the variables by 
using two likelihood test statistics offered by Johansen and Juselius (1990: 169-210) known 
as maximum eigenvalue for the null hypothesis of r versus the alternative of r+1 cointegrating 
relationships and trace for the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the 
alternative  of  k  cointegrating  relations,  for  r = 0, 1,  ...  , k-1  where  k  is  the  number  of   
 
                                                 
8 For the appropriate lag length to ensure that the residuals are Gaussian, i.e.. they do not suffer from 
autocorrelation, non-normality, etc., considering the presence of cointegrating relationships, Cheung and Lai 
(1993: 313-328) find that Monte Carlo experience carried out using data generating processes (DGPs) suggests 
that tests of cointegration rank are relatively robust to over-parametrizing, while setting too small a value of lag 
length –such as lag length one or two generally suggested by SC statistics also producing serial correlation 
problem– severely distorts the size of the maximum likelihood tests (Cheung and Lai, 1993: 319-322: Harris, 
1995: 121 footnote 12). Gonzalo (1994: 220-221) also reveals that the cost of overparametrizing by including 
more lags in the maximum likelihood based error correction model (ECM) is small in terms of efficiency lost, 
but this is not the case if the ECM is underparametrized. 
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TABLE 4: VAR LAG ORDER SELECTION CRITERIA 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Endogeneous variables: LNREALM1 ENFLASYON 
Exogeneous variables: C D_Q2 D_Q3 D_Q4 DUMMY1 DUMMY2 
Sample: 1987.1 2004.4 
Included observations: 60 
Lag  LR   FPE   AIC   SC   HQ 
0  NA   0.0008  -1.4203  -1.0014  -1.2564 
1  168.65  3.71E-05  -4.5303  -3.9718*  -4.3118 
2  8.1280  3.61E-05  -4.5595  -3.8614  -4.2864 
3  3.8710  3.82E-05  -4.5068  -3.6691 -4.1791 
4  8.7792  3.63E-05  -4.5643  -3.5869  -4.1820 
5  17.178*  2.84E-05*  -4.8214*  -3.7044  -4.3845* 
6  4.4650  2.95E-05  -4.7944  -3.5377  -4.3028 
7  5.4327  2.98E-05  -4.7968  -3.4006  -4.2507 
8  3.1116  3.20E-05  -4.7454  -3.2095  -4.1446 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 
endogeneous variables. Following Harris (1995: 87-88) briefly to say, to test the null 
hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors and thus k-r unit roots amounts to, 
 
H0: λi = 0, i = r+1, …, k          (9) 
 
where only the first r eigenvalues are non-zero. This restriction can be imposed for different 
values of r and then the log of the maximised likelihood function for the restricted model is 
compared to the log of the maximised likelihood function of the unrestricted model and a 
standard likelihood ratio test computed. That is, it is possible to test the null hypothesis using 
the trace statistic, 
 
λtrace = -2 log (Q) = -T 
1
k
i r= +
∑  log (1-λi),  r = 0, 1, 2, …, k-2, k-1    (10) 
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where Q = (restricted maximised likelihood / unrestricted maximised likelihood), T is the 
sample size. Asymptotic critical and their probability values are provided in Osterwald-
Lenum (1992: 461-472) and in MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999: 563-577). Another test 
of the significance of the largest λi is the maximal-eigenvalue statistic, 
 
λmax = -T log (1-λr+1),  r = 0, 1 ,2, …, k-2, k-1      (11) 
 
which tests that there are r cointegration vectors against the alternative that r+1 exist. Table 5 
below reports the results of Johansen Cointegration Test using max-eigen and trace tests 
based on critical values taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992: 461-472), also available from 
the VAR and COINT procedures in EViews 5.0. For the cointegration test, we restrict 
intercept and the trend factor into our long run variable space, so assume that the trend factor 
can include the effects of other factors which are not considered in the cointegrating analysis.9 
From the Table 5, in which we normalize the cointegrating vector estimated upon real 
monetary balances, both trace and max-eigen statistics indicate jointly 1 potential 
cointegrating vector in the long run variable space considering 5% level critical values. 
 
In Table 6, we give the normalized cointegrating vector upon real money balances in a 
parsimonious vector error correction form including both an F- and LR-test for the reduction 
of insignificant variables in our model. Using QMS (2004: 563), these tests are for whether a 
subset of variables in an equation all have zero coefficients and might thus be deleted from 
the equation. The latter ‘D’ beginning of a variable indicates the first difference operator, [ ] 
the normalized cointegrating vector on real money balances and t-statistics are in parentheses. 
                                                 
9 We follow here the so-called Pantula principle. Johansen (1992: 383-397) and Harris (1995: 97) suggest the 
need to test the joint hypothesis of both the rank order and the deterministic components, and the former tries to 
demonstrate how to use the tables in Johansen and Juselius (1990: 169-210) for conducting inference about the 
cointegration rank. The reason that inference is difficult is that the asymptotic distribution under the null of the 
test statistic depends on which parameter value is considered under the null. In the case of a cointegration 
analysis, the limit distribution depends on the actual (true) number of the cointegrating relations and also on the 
presence of a linear trend. Following Pantula (1989: 256-271), they propose to identify the sub-hypotheses, 
which give different limit distributions, and construct a test statistic and a critical region for each of these sub-
hypotheses. The critical region for the test of the original null hypothesis is then the intersection of the critical 
regions constructed for each of the subhypotheses or, in other words, the hypothesis in question is only rejected 
if all subhypotheses are rejected. Following Harris (1995: 97), the test procedure is to move through from the 
most restrictive model and at each stage to compare the trace or max-eigen test statistics to its critical value and 
only stop the first time the null hypothesis is not rejected. However, a critical point to be considered here may be 
that assuming quadratic deterministic trends in cointegrating space allowing for also linear trends in the short run 
VEC model may be economically difficult to justify especially if the variables are entered in log-linear form or 
in linear growth rates, since this would imply an implausible ever-increasing or decreasing rate of change 
(Harris, 1995: 96). 
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TABLE 5: COINTEGRATION RANK TEST ASSUMING LINEAR DETERMINISTIC 
TREND RESTRICTED IN COINTEGRATING EQUATION 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Null hypothesis  r=0    r≤1 
Eigenvalue   0.315686   0.127860 
λ trace   32.00093   8.481946 
5% Crirical Value  25.32    12.25 
1% Critical Value  30.45    16.26 
λ max    23.51898   8.481946 
%5 Critical Value  18.96    12.25 
%1 Critical Value  23.65    16.26 
Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients 
LNREALM1   ENFLASYON   TREND 
 26.64317    20.95545     0.111977 
-6.132020   -5.908780    -0.093171 
Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha) 
D(LNREALM1)  -0.028012   -0.011078 
D(ENFLASYON)  -0.000603    0.023919 
Adjustment Coefficients (std. err. in parentheses) 
D(LNREALM1)  -0.746336 
   (0.20487) 
D(INFLATION)  -0.016074 
   (0.26570) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Table 6, we see that the normalized semi-elasticity of domestic inflation is -0.786522 and 
this leads us to the seigniorage revenue maximizing annualized quarterly inflation rate of 
127%. In our sample period, the mean of actual annualized quarterly inflation rate is %65, and 
thus we can conclude that the Turkish economy lies on the correct side of the Laffer curve 
with respect to seigniorage revenue inside the estimation period considered. These estimation 
results are consistent with empirical papers on this issue upon Turkish economy, such as 
Akçay (1995: 210-229), Kural (1997: 45-57), Özmen (1998: 545-553), to some extent Selçuk 
(2001: 41-50), Soydan (2003) and Özdemir and Turner (2004), while Metin and Muslu (1999:  
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TABLE 6: VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION ESTIMATES 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Redundant Variables: DUMMY2 DLNREALM1(-1) DLNREALM1(-2) DLNREALM1(-4) 
DLNREALM1(-5) DINFLATION(-1) 
F-statistic   0.313699  Probability  0.926437 
Log likelihood ratio  2.555136  Probability  0.862247 
DLNREALM1 = 0.018 - 0.0945 DUMMY1 - 0.043 D_Q2 + 0.060 D_Q3 - 0.075 D_Q4 
                           (2.284) (-1.884)                      (-1.735)           (2.300)      (-3.020) 
+ 0.360 DLNREALM1(-3) + 0.202 DINFLATION(-2) + 0.338 DINFLATION(-3) + 
 (2.470)                                   (2.800)             (3.584) 
0.282 DINFLATION(-4) + 0.192 DINFLATION(-5) – 0.725  
 (2.856)             (2.350)                                (-4.580) 
 [LNREALM1(-1) + 0.786522 INFLATION(-1) + 0.004203 TREND - 4.440591] 
                                  (14.527)                                  (7.571) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
415-426) estimate that monetary authorities expanded the money supply in order to maximize 
the inflation tax revenue in Turkey and find also that the Cagan model cannot be linked with 
the rational expectations for the Turkish case, in a way contradicting the estimation results of 
Tunay (2003: 65-83). 
 
Özmen (1998: 545-553) expresses that quantity theoretical hypotheses state that the long run 
money demand variable space can be postulated to explain inflation with money (and also real 
income) being weakly exogeneous in the system, while Keynesian theory alleges that the long 
run money demand variable space can be postulated to explain money conditioned upon the 
demand arguments such as real income and inflation. Adjustment coefficients estimated in 
Table 5 above indicate that our results give support to the Keynesian view rather than that of 
the Quantity Theory. In this line and following Özmen, these findings do not necessarily 
imply that, had there been an active seigniorage policy instead of accommodating the demand, 
the government would have obtained a higher inflation tax revenue. This is because the real 
tax revenue may not be invariant to the way the public sector borrowing requirement is 
financed, and also attempts to increase seigniorage revenue might push the economy in a 
hyperinflationary path (Soydan, 2003). 
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For the diagnostics given below, we find that our model estimation procedure is a good 
approximation of the actual data generating process, maybe except the possible structural 
break for the post-1994 period, indicating changes in the monetary policy for policy makers. 
Besides, we can see that the vector diagnostics do not indicate any problem of autocorrelated 
residuals, but some non-normality due to excess kurtosis, no problem in our model through 
Gonzalo (1994: 203-233).10 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In our paper, we try to investigate the course of inflation tax and seigniorage revenue for 
policy makers of the Turkish economy. For this purpose, we first construct an ex-ante 
seigniorage revenue maximizing inflation model á la Cagan (1956: 25-117), and then 
calculate annual inflation tax and seigniorage revenues for the post-1980 period Turkish 
economy. Following these theoretical issues, an empirical model is constructed upon the 
Turkish economy, and our ex-post estimation results reveal that inside the period considered, 
the Turkish economy lies on the correct or efficient side of the seigniorage maximizing Laffer 
curve. 
 
 
                                                 
10 We have estimated the same real money demand function with a real income variable in natural logarithms in 
addition to the inflation variable in semi-logarithmic form. Friedman (1971: 847) expresses that an inflation tax 
or seigniorage revenue maximizing analysis such as in our paper is entirely correct for a stationary economy with 
fixed real income. But this is seriously misleading for a growing economy in which the issuer of money obtains a 
yield from two sources, i.e., a tax on existing real cash balances and provision of the additional real cash 
balances that are demanded as income rises. In this case, the rate of price rise that will give maximum total yield 
would be lower for a growing economy. In terms of Equation (4), if we include real income variable in natural 
logarithms (yr) into the money demand specification, and then construct the inflation rate maximizing 
seigniorage revenue by taking partial derivative of money demand function,  
 
loge(M/P) = b - απ + δyr + ε          (12) 
 
we find that seigniorage maximising inflation rate would now be, 
 
π* = (1/α) - βgγ            (13) 
 
where β represents the income elasticity of demand for real money balances and gγ the growth rate of real 
income (Friedman, 1971: 850; Bruno and Fischer, 1990: 356). Using a trivariate same order integrated variables, 
the VAR system such as estimated in this paper, with three centered seasonal dummies and two impulse crisis 
dummies and a restricted trend in the long run variable space, have produced a unique cointegrating vector 
resulting in both an approximately same and statistically significant semi-elasticity of inflation and insignificant 
real income elasticity. These results are available upon request. So we consider in our paper a bivariate stationary 
relationship between real monetary balances in natural logarithms and inflation in semi-elasticities such as the 
original Cagan (1956: 25-117) type money demand function. 
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TABLE 7: DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
Lag 1  F-statistic  0.016395  Probability  0.898639 
Obs*R-squared 0.020403  Probability  0.886417 
Lag 4  F-statistic  1.057983  Probability  0.388062 
Obs*R-squared  5.139117  Probability  0.273319 
ARCH test 
Lag 1  F-statistic  0.178256 Probability  0.674437 
Obs*R-squared  0.183838  Probability  0.668095 
Lag 4  F-statistic  1.227429 Probability  0.310597 
Obs*R-squared  4.917503  Probability  0.295867 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 
F-statistic   1.411666  Probability  0.180659 
Obs*R-squared  20.69162  Probability  0.190671 
Jarque-Bera   0.406581  Probability  0.816041 
Chow Forecast Test: 1994.2 to 2004.4 
F-statistic   1.301123  Probability  0.383401 
Log likelihood ratio  133.9806  Probability  0.000000 
Chow Forecat Test: 2000.1 to 2004.4 
F-statistic   0.472779  Probability  0.957927 
Log likelihood ratio  16.71268  Probability  0.671544 
Chow Forecast Test: 2001.1 to 2004.4 
F-statistic   0.471698  Probability  0.944463 
Log likelihood ratio  12.22860  Probability  0.728099 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Test (Probs. from chi-square with 4 df.) 
H0: no serial correlation at lag order h 
Lags   LM-Stat   Prob. 
4   5.133632   0.2739 
VEC Residual Normality Test 
H0: residuals are multivariate normal 
Skewness χ2(2)=0.187777  Prob. 0.6648  Kurtosis χ2(2)=9.160030  Prob. 0.0103 
Jarque-Bera χ2(4)=9.420369  Prob. 0.0514 
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A complementary analysis to our paper can be implemented by including the currency 
substitution phenomenon into the real money demand equation producing seigniorage 
maximizing inflation rate for a future work such as Phylaktis and Taylor (1993: 32-37) and 
Şıklar (1998: 3-14) so as to see whether the findings are in line with our ex-post estimation 
results in this paper. Fischer (1982: 306-307) expresses that currency substitution or 
dollarization may bring out substantial seigniorage costs that would be paid to a foreign 
country to import high-powered money, plus the excess welfare burden incurred by giving up 
independent control over the domestic rate of high-powered money creation for the domestic 
economy. So, such an issue should be dealt with by the researchers for the case of the Turkish 
economy. 
 
Of course, our estimation results in this paper should be taken into account cautiously by 
considering an economics policy perspective, since policy implementations in favor of the 
larger seigniorage revenue, due to the estimation results giving support to that the Turkish 
economy lies inside the correct or efficient side of the seigniorage maximizing Laffer curve, 
can take the economy into a hyperinflationary path. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adam, Christopher, Ndulu, Benno and Sowa, Nii Kwaku (1996), “Liberalisation and 
Seigniorage Revenue in Kenya, Ghana and Tanzania”, Development Studies, Vol 32/4; 531-
553. 
 
Akçay, Cevdet (1995), “Inflation Tax in a Post-Liberalization Environment: Evidence from 
Turkey, 1980-1990”, in Balim, Ç. et al. (eds), Turkey: Political, Social and Economic 
Challenges in the 1990s, Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill; 210-229. 
 
Altınkemer, Melike (1994), “Financeable Deficit & Revenues from Monetization The Case of 
Turkey”, CBRT Research Department Working Paper, No. 9413.  
 
Anand, Ritu and van Wijnbergen, Sweder (1988), “Inflation, External Debt and Financial 
Sector Reform: A Quantitative Approach to Consistent Fiscal Policy with an Application to 
Turkey”, NBER Working Paper, No. 2731. 
19 
 
 
Begg, David, Fischer, Stanley and Dornbusch, Rudiger (1994), Economics, Fourth Ed., 
McGraw-Hill Book Company 
 
Blanchard, Olivier (1997), Macroeconomics, International Edition, Prentice-Hall 
International, Inc. 
 
Bruno, Michael and Fischer, Stanley (1990), “Seigniorage, Operating Rules, and the High 
Inflation Trap”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 105/2; 353-374. 
 
Cagan, Phillip (1956), “The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation”, in Friedman, M. (ed.), 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 25-117. 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Leiderman, Leonardo (1992), “Optimal Inflation Tax under 
Precommitment: Theory and Evidence”, The American Economic Review, Vol 82/1; 179-194. 
 
Cheung, Yin-Wong and Lai, Kon S. (1993), “Finite-sample Sizes of Johansen’s Likelihood 
Ratio Tests for Cointegration”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol 55; 313-28. 
 
De Haan, Jakob, Zelhorst, Dick and Roukens, Onno (1993), “Seigniorage in Developing 
Countries”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol 3; 307-314. 
 
Dickey, David A., Jansen, Dennis W. and Thornton, Daniel L. (1991), “A Primer on 
Cointegration with An Application to Money and Income”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Review, March/April; 58-78. 
 
Domaç, İlker (2004), “Explaining and Forcasting Inflation in Turkey”,World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, 3287, April. 
 
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Fischer, Stanley (1994), Macroeconomics, Sixth Edition, McGraw-
Hill, Inc. 
 
20 
 
Easterly, William R., Mauro, Paolo and Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus (1995), “Money Demand and 
Seigniorage-Maximizing Inflation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 27/2; 583-
603. 
 
Engle, Robert F. and Granger, C. W. J. (1987). "Co-integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing", Econometrica, Vol 55; 251-276. 
 
Fischer, Stanley (1982), “Seigniorage and the Case for a National Money”, The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol 90/2; 295-313. 
 
Friedman, Milton (1971), “Government Revenue from Inflation”, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol 79/4; 846-856. 
 
Gonzalo, Jesus (1994), “Five Alternative Methods of Estimating Long-Run Equilibrium 
Relationships”, Journal of Econometrics, Vol 60; 203-233. 
 
Granger, C.W.J. and Newbold, Paul (1974), “Spurious Regressions in Economics”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol 2/2; 111-120. 
 
Harris, R.I.D. (1995), Using Cointegration Analysis in Econometric Modelling, Prentice Hall. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2005), World Economic Outlook, April. 
 
Johansen, Sǿren (1995), Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Models, Oxford University Press. 
 
Johansen, Sǿren and Juselius, Katarina (1992), “Testing Structural Hypotheses in a 
Multivariate Cointegration Analysis of the PPP and the UIP for UK”, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol 53; 211-244. 
 
Johansen, Sǿren and Juselius, Katarina (1990), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inference on Cointegration-with applications to the demand for money”, Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol 52; 169-210. 
21 
 
Kiguel, Miguel A. and Neumeyer, Pablo Andres (1995), “Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case 
of Argentina”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol 27/3; 672-682. 
 
Koru, Ayça-Tekin and Özmen, Erdal (2003), “Budget Deficits, Money Growth and Inflation: 
The Turkish Evidence”, Applied Economics, Vol 35/5; 591-596. 
 
Kural, Vural (1997), “Para İkamesi Altında Enflasyonist Finansman”, Hazine Dergisi, Ocak, 
Vol 5; 45-57. 
 
MacKinnon, James G. (1996), “Numerical Distribution Functions for Unit Root and 
Cointegration Tests”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol 11; 601-618. 
 
MacKinnon, James G., Haug, Alfred A. and Michelis, Leo (1999), "Numerical Distribution 
Functions of Likelihood Ratio Tests For Cointegration" Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol 
14; 563-577. 
 
Metin, Kıvılcım and Muslu, İlker (1999), “Money Demand, the Cagan Model, Testing 
Rational Expectations vs Adaptive Expectations: The Case of Turkey”, Empirical Economics, 
Vol 24; 415-426. 
 
Osterwald-Lenum, Michael (1992), “A note with Quantiles of the Asymptotic Distribution of 
the Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol 54; 461-472. 
 
Özdemir, K Azim and Turner, Paul (2004), “The Demand for Base Money in Turkey: 
Implications for Inflation and Seigniorage”, CBRT Research Department Working Paper, No. 
04/12. 
 
Özmen, Erdal (1998), “Is Currency Seigniorage Exogeneous for Inflation Tax in Turkey”, 
Applied Economics, Vol 30/4; 545-552. 
 
Pantula, S.G. (1989), “Testing for Unit Roots in Time Series Data”, Econometric Theory, Vol 
5; 256-271. 
22 
 
Paya, Merih (1997), Makroiktisat, Filiz Kitabevi, İstanbul. 
 
Phylaktis, Kate and Taylor, Mark P. (1993), “Money Demand, The Cagan Model and the 
Inflation Tax: Some Latin American Evidence”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol 
75/1; 32-37. 
 
QMS (2004), EViews 5 User’s Guide, April. 
 
Rodrik, Dani (1990), “Premature Liberalization, Incomplete Stabilization: The Ozal Decade 
in Turkey”, NBER Working Paper, No. 3300. 
 
Saatçioğlu, Cem and Korap, Levent (2006), “Determinants of Turkish Inflation”, Turkish 
Economic Association Discussion Paper, 2006/7. 
 
Selçuk, Faruk (2001), “Seigniorage, Currency Substitution and Inflation in Turkey”, Russian 
and East European Finance and Trade, Vol 37/6; 41-50. 
 
Soydan, Aylin (2003), “Financial Liberalization, Currency Substitution and Seigniorage 
Evidence from Turkey”, Paper Presented to the Conference on Policy Modeling, July 3-5, 
Istanbul. 
 
Sönmez, Sinan (1998), “Türkiye’de Kamu (Açığının) Finansmanı ve Enflasyon Vergisi”, 
ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, Vol 25/2; 361-377. 
 
Şıklar, İlyas (1998), “Currency Substitution and Seigniorage Revenue in a Developing 
Country: The Turkish Case”, Yapı Kredi Economic Review, Vol 9/1; 3-14. 
 
 
